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Abstract
Radical right-wing populist parties have recently emerged throughout Europe, but the electoral success among
these parties is incredibly inconsistent. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV)
has become established in the country’s political system, while the British National Party (BNP) and the
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) struggle to gain even a single seat in British parliament. Models
outlining a formula for the rise and success of populist parties can help explain why some parties achieve an
electoral breakthrough and others do not. Researcher of radical right populism Pippa Norris’ model of
electoral success is divided into a political demand side that focuses on the public grievances driving these
parties, and a political supply side that focuses on internal party activity as well as external factors shaping
opportunity structure. This essay compares Britain’s two radical right populist parties, the BNP and the UKIP,
with the PVV in the Netherlands, and applies Norris’ framework to explain the greater electoral success of the
PVV. It concludes that while Britain and Netherlands are similar in terms of political demand, populist parties
have seen more success in the Netherlands because supply-side factors are more favorable.
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RADICAL RIGHT POPULIST PARTIES IN BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS: 
EXPLAINING ELECTORAL SUCCESS 
Casey Plach 
Radical right-wmg populist parties have recently emerged throughout Europe, but the 
electoral success among these parties is incredibly mconsistent. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders' 
Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) has become established in the country's political system, while the 
British National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) struggle to gam 
even a single seat in British parliament. Models outlining a formula for the rise and success of 
populist parties can help explain why some parties achieve an electoral breaktiuough and others do 
not. Researcher of radical right populism Pippa Norris' model of electoral success is divided mto a 
political demand side that focuses on the public grievances driving these parties, and a political 
supply side that focuses on mternal party activity as well as external factors shaping opportunity 
structure. This essay compares Britain's two radical right populist parties, the BNP and the UKIP, 
with the PVV in the Netherlands, and applies Norris' framework to explain the greater electoral 
success of the PVV. It concludes that while Britain and Netherlands are similar in terms of political 
demand, populist parties have seen more success in the Netherlands because supply-side factors are 
more favorable. 
Poptllist Parties in the U.K and the Netherlands 
The British National Party was formed in 1982 by John Tyndall when he split from the 
National Front, a far-right party for whites only. With its ideological roots in fascism, the BNP has 
struggled to gain political legitimacy and respect. Current leader Nick Griffin has called for a 
modernization of the party to change this. He denies the fascist label and instead identifies the party 
as having "ideological foundations of a twenty-fIrst-century 'popular nationalism,"'j Following 
Griffin's transformation, the BNP's platform defends "democracy, freedom, culture, and identity"2 
Despite this reconstruction, key grievances remained the same, with immigration and European 
Union membership at the forefront. However, the party's rhetoric has changed in an attempt to 
appear less radical. For example, the BNP is extremely anti-immigrant, seeing immigrants as a threat 
to British culture, and it uses nativist rhetoric in an attempt to legitimize these concerns. BNP 
members defend their stance on the grounds that multiculturalism "wipes out indigenous cultures 
and identities through homogenization" and so, by opposing it, they "[are] not racists but legitimate 
defenders of ethnic and cultural diversity."3 The BNP is also very anti-European Union because it 
sees the EU as a threat to democracy and national sovereignty. The party's target out-groups include 
1 Copsey 2007, 75 
2 "Democracy" 2010 
3 Copsey 2007, 74 
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political actors in the EU as well as immigrants within the state, especially Muslims. A vertical 
structure of antagonisms is observed, as the party attacks both the "corrupt elites" at the top of 
society and the "dangerous others" at the bottom. With these key issues driving the party, the BNP 
garners support from "deprived and less well educated members of the working class [who] feel 
under 'threat' from immigration."4 
Eleven years after the BNP's emergence, Alan Sked founded the Anti-Federalist League, 
which would later evolve into The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) now led by Nigel 
Farage. The Anti-Federalist league was a campaign against the Maastricht Treaty, so at its inception 
the UKIP's platform solely promoted anti-EU sentiments. Realizing it could not last as a single-issue 
party, the UKIP broadened its appeals. It currently identifies itself as a "democratic, libertarian party" 
and focuses on leaving the EU and restoring democracy by empowering the people. Its manifesto 
explains its anti-EU stance and continues, "But the EU is only the biggest symptom of the real 
problem - the theft of our democracy by a powerful, remote political 'elite' which has forgotten that 
it's here to serve the people.'" The UI<JP's enemies are the mainstream politicians in both Britain 
and the ED. Immigration is also a concern, but the UKIP takes an economic perspective focusing on 
limited jobs and welfare, unlike the BNP's cultural protectionist stance. The absence of overtly racist 
rhetoric has helped the UI<IP be more successful and appear as a more respectable party than the 
BNP. The party's basis of mobilization consists of Eurosceptic voters and ordinary, working-class 
people, but it also attracts some dissatisfied Conservatives. 
In 2002, almost a decade after the UKIP was founded, the Netherlands saw the rise of the 
Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), a radical right party populist that set the stage for the emergence of Geert 
Wilder's Party for Freedom in 2006. Pim Fortuyn founded the LPF in response to the "Purple 
Coalition" coalition formed by three of the mainstream parties who, he felt, ignored the people. He 
was killed just before the 2002 election, but the party gained 17 percent of the vote and twenty-six 
seats in Dutch Parliament.6 However, the LPF's success was short-lived. With the death of Fortuyn, 
the party lost its organizational leadership and experienced internal conflict, ultimately leading to its 
collapse. Just a few years later, Geert Wilders took over as the country's new populist leader. He 
broke from the mainstream right People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) after 
disagreeing with the parliament leader about Turkey obtaining EU membership and founded Geert 
Wilders' Dutch Party for Freedom. His party focuses on the same issues as the BNP and UI<IP, with 
the major concerns being EU membership, immigration, and restoring democracy. Target out-groups 
are also similar, as the PVV is very hostile to political elites working for the EU and the mainstream 
4 Goodwin 2012, 20 
5 "The Only" 
6 Van Kessel 2011, 74 
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Dutch parties, as well as to Muslim immigrants. For Wilders, "Islam is perceived as a violent 
'ideology' and Dutch culture should be protected against the process of Islamisation."7 Like the 
BNP, he employs nativist rhetoric in an attempt to restore national sovereignty by means of bringing 
ownership back to the "ttue and good people," also referred to as the heartland. The PVV mainly 
draws support from Eurosceptic voters and so-called "losers of modernization," who have lost their 
jobs to outsourcing, technological development, and other effects of globalization. They are 
considered the "ordinary hardworking men and women"- a phrase that Wilders is never hesitant to 
employ.8 
Demalld 
The demand side of Norris' model focuses on public grievances and how these grievances 
drive the emergence of new political parties. Touching on the most prominent concerns among 
countries in \Vestern Europe, Norris explains, "the rising salience of cultural protectionism, in a 
backlash against globalization and population migration, has altered the public agenda in each 
countty, providing sporadic openings for new parties.'" Public grievances increase electoral demand, 
and the higher the electoral demand for PRR parties, the more likely they are to succeed. 
Furthermore, if there is dissatisfaction among the public, voters are more likely to be receptive to 
parties who address issues that mainstream parties have ignored or failed to solve. Dissatisfaction in 
Britain and the Netherlands has stemmed from sttuctural changes both countries have experienced in 
recent years. Both countries became member states of the European Union, were affected by the 
economic crisis of 2008, are subject to negative effects of globalization, and have experienced an 
increase in immigration. These changes produced electoral demand and led to the emergence of 
populist parties. 
To determine what grievances are present in Britain and the Netherlands, data from the 
Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey of 2012 can be examined. One question on the survey asks, 
''What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?" 
The three highest ranked issues in the United Kingdom were unemployment (40 percent), the 
economic situation (30 percent), and immigration (24 percent). In the Netherlands, they were the 
economic situation (55 percent), health and social security (46 percent), and unemployment (32 
percent). Unemployment and the economic situation were concerns in both countries, which 
demonstrates that on the macro level the public has similar grievances. 
Populist radical right parties in Western Europe have found success capitalizing on issues of 
democracy, globalization, and immigration, all of which are public concerns in the Netherlands and 
7 Van Kessel 2011, 75 
8 Ibid., 84 
, Norris 2005, 4 
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the United I<::ingdom. According to a May 2004 Eurobarometer survey, 27 percent of Dutch 
respondents and 23 percent of British respondents indicated that they were not very satisfied with 
the way democracy works in their country. Satisfaction rates were similar on all measures, which 
indicates that both countries were experiencing similar gtievances. Populist parties were gaining 
ground when this survey was taken, and with about a quarter of the public in each country expressing 
dissatisfaction with their democratic process, the demand was present for a populist party to 
respond. 
In terms of globalization, results from the May 2012 Eurobarometer survey indicated that 24 
percent of Dutch respondents and 37 percent of Btitish respondents believed globalization 
represents a threat to employment and companies. This is another public concern, common in both 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; One outcome of globalization is an increase in 
immigration rates, which is an issue that has not escaped notice in Western Europe. Currently, the 
foreign born population in Netherlands makes up 11.2 percent of the total population, and in Britain 
12.9 percent.to The public is wary of the immigrant population and high immigration rates, and 
populist parties are acting on these concerns. 
In both the United I<::ingdom and the Netherlands, public demand is present for a party that 
offers simple solutions to restore democracy, protect the country from the negative effects of 
globalization, and limit immigration. The opportunity exists in both countries for radical right 
populist parties to respond and flnd success. Overall, the demand actually appears to be slightly 
stronger in Britain. Immigration, a central focus for all three populist parties, ranks among the U.K.'s 
top three concerns and 13 percent more of the British public views globalization as a threat. 
However, demand is not a direct indicator of success. This is especially apparent in the 2010 general 
election results. In Britain, the UKIP gained 3.2 percent of the vote, and the BNP gained 1.9 percent, 
but neither won a seat in parliament." In the Netherlands' 2010 general election, the PVV gained 
15.5 percent of the vote, which earned it twenty-four seats out of 150 in parliament.12 While both 
countries are similar in terms of political demand, the PVV has clearly seen greater electoral success, 
not only in seats gained but also in overall share of the vote. To explain this difference, political 
supply-side factors must be considered. 
StlPPfy (Extema� 
Norris explains that demand alone is not enough to guarantee the success of populist parties. 
She introduces a supply side, which "focus[es] upon patterns of party competition, including where 
mainstream parties decide to place themselves ... as well as the actions taken by the radical right 
10 OEeD 2013 
11 Denyer 2010, 593 
12 Van Kessel 2011, 74 
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themselves."" External supply-side factors include electoral conditions, ideological space, availability 
of the electorate, and the media. These factors are outside of party control, but in certain instances 
they can contribute to the electoral success of populist parties. 
A country's electoral conditions are critical in deciding how many seats a party will gain. 
Although the BNP and the UKIP do not hold any seats in the British Parliament, they do have a 
combined fourteen seats in the European Parliament. This difference has only one possible 
explanation: the electoral system. In the United Kingdom, general elections use a first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) system where the candidate who earns the most votes wins the seat. As Duverger's law 
states, plurality rule voting tends to produce two-party systems, which "makes it rather difficult for 
new political forces (populist or otherwise) to make an electoral breakthrough."!4 This type of system 
can also discourage the electorate from voting for a third party candidate because their vote will most 
likely not carry any significance. The BNP and UKIP received a combined 5.1 percent of the vote in 
the last election, but "the FPTP electoral system continues to restrict their ability to impact on 
national level politicS."15 
Because the European Parliament uses a proportional representation system (FR), the BNP 
and UKIP have experienced some electoral success at this level. In this system, candidates gain seats 
in proportion to the number of votes they receive. The Netherlands also uses a PR system for its 
general election, which in part explains the electoral success of the PVV. The system has no 
established threshold, meaning that parties only need .67 percent of the popular vote to gain a seat." 
The electoral conditions naturally encourage new parties to enter the political arena. In fact, 
"[b]etween 1946 and 2003, 18 new parties have gained entry into parliament."!7 The PVV has 
benefitted from this open and accessible system, while the BNP and UKIP are working under 
conditions that impede electoral success. 
Other actors in the political system also have an effect on a party's success. Mainstream 
parties play a role because their position on the political spectrum and whether or not they respond 
to the concerns of the public determines how much ideological space exists for a populist party to 
emerge. In the United Kingdom, mainstream parties are much more in tune with public grievances. 
They will respond to constituent concerns and often "shift policies to mop up temporary forms of 
discontent."18 In fact, the Conservative party has even used populist rhetoric itself, "portray[ing] the 
13 Norris 2005, 14 
14 Fella 2008,182 
15 Ibid., 197 
" Lucardie 2008, 152 
17 Ibid., 152 
18 John and Margetts 2009,497 
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New Labour as an out-of-touch liberal metropolitan elite selling out the British people."" This does 
not bode well for populist parties who insist that all parts of the establishment are unresponsive to 
the people. Rather than gaining the political legitimacy that they aim for, these parties are restricted to 
the role of a pressure group on established parties. For example, the BNP and the UKIP both 
concentrate on immigration, but mainstream parties have responde� to the issue as well, 
undermining their efforts. In fact, many might agree with Matthew Goodwin that the "Conservatives 
have offered a more credible brand to citizens anxious over immigration."'o Established parties in the 
U.K. present themselves as a more legitimate option and since they respond to public concerns, there 
is very little ideological space for a populist party to succeed. 
In contrast, mainstream parties in the Netherlands have converged ideologically and are 
unresponsive to public concerns, opening political space where populist parties can thrive. With a 
highly consociational political system in the Netherlands, these parties have not established distinct 
platforms and have converged in such a way that voters cannot distinguish between them.21 The 
Labour Party, for example, attempted to address multiculturalism and the public's concerns over 
cultural preservation, but they gave up and "by 2003 . . . little was separating the three mainstream 
parties on this issue."22 This allowed for populist parties, such as the PVV, to step in and be the 
answer voters were looking for. In addition, mainstream parties in the Netherlands are on the whole 
less likely to respond to public grievances. Unlike mainstream parties in the U.K. that at least attempt 
to deal with high immigration rates, "[e]stablished parties [in the Netherlands] failed to recognize that 
citizens actually were concerned about the perceived problems of immigration."23 This provides the 
perfect opportunity for the PVV to claim that the establishment is ignoring important issues and that 
the people are not being heard. 
Even if political parties are responsive to public grievances, the availability of the electorate 
is an important factor in determining the support a populist party will obtain. With the UK's highly 
structured patty system, voters are not very receptive to new parties like tlle BNP or UKIP. 
Availability in large part depends on how tied voters are to their respective parties, and in the U.K. 
mainstream parties have been relatively stable and remain legitimate choices. A State of the Nation 
Poll measuring views on the BNP indicates that only 9 percent of self-identified Conservatives 
"might vote for" the BNP in the future.24 There are some dissatisfied conservatives, but for the most 
part voters are loyal to their respective parties and would not readily abandon them for a new one. 
19 Fella 2008, 197 
20 Goodwin 2012, 17 
21 Van Kessel 2011, 78 
22 Ibid., 79 
21 Ibid. 
24 John and Mar getts 2009, 507 
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Meanwhile, the electorate in the Netherlands is highly receptive to new parties because of 
structural changes the country experienced in the twentieth century. Before World War II, Dutch 
society was organized according to different symbolic pillars, including a Protestant, Catholic, and 
Socialist pillar. Schools, media, and political parties were divided according to these pillars, but this 
system broke down and society experienced drastic changes, especially in the political system. Within 
this pillarized structure "the electorate largely voted along the cleavage lines of religion and social 
class .. " By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the explanatory power of this factor had 
become very 10w."25 Voters are no longer tied to the pillars that in the past had defined all their 
choices, and today parties are still developing to respond to the new social structure. This upheaval 
means that voters are "less loyal to traditional parties and ready to give the benefit of the doubt to 
new parties."" The PVV is one new party trying to establish itself in this new political structure and 
with such a highly receptive electorate, it has been able to experience success. 
Another factor that can help or hurt a party in its attempts to find electoral success is the 
media. In Britain, the media is very critical of the UKIP and the BNP. In her study on populist 
parties and their relation to the popular media, Tjitske Akkerman notes: 
One of the reasons that the BNP is less successful is that it faces a less favorable discursive 
oppottunity structure. In contrast to the PVV, a party that is treated by Dutch political 
parties and the media as a normal parry, the BNP has been generally stigmatized by leading 
politicians and the media as a racist or fascist patty.27 
The BNP's platform is controversial, and its attempts to legitimize itself are stunted by the media. 
While less radical than the BNP, the UKIP also faces trouble in establishing legitimacy. It directs its 
efforts in distancing itself from the BNP, but is still viewed by the media and by many voters as 
radical. 
As Akkerman points out, the PVV is considered normal and established in the Netherlands, 
even though it employs much of the same rhetoric as the BNP and the UKIP. The party is highly 
institutionalized and has enough support to be considered a normal part of the political system, 
which is why the media is less critical. After pillarization, parties were no longer supported by mass 
media, and for the most part the media has attempted to remain neutral. Therefore, the party's "core 
consists of a leader and a parliamentary group that is very effectively fenced off for outsiders in 
general and journalists in particular."28 Geert Wilders is the only formal member of the PVV, so it is 
not a very open organization. Without the media working against it, the PVV has an easier time 
developing a positive reputation. 
25 Van Kessel 2011, 77 
26 Lucar die 2008, 155 
27 Akkerman 2009, 935 
28 Akker man 2009, 935 
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SUPPlY (Illtental) 
Although many factors work outside of party control, there are supply-side factors that allow 
parties to direct their own success. Further criticizing the one-sided model that only focuses on 
demand, Norris explains, "demand-side analysis is too simple and instead we need to give far greater 
emphasis to what parties can do through thelr own actions as strategic agents."29 Here she is referring 
to the internal supply-side factors, which include leadership and party organization. Parries have 
control over these factors, so it is their responsibility to craft favorable conditions and create their 
own political success. 
Populist parties regard the public as a homogenous body, so a charismatic leader who 
embodies the people plays a central role in a party's development and success. In Britain, the BNP 
has struggled with leadership and building party reputation. John Tyndall, the original leader of the 
BNP, embraced the fascist label and took extreme stances on many issues, believing that "all that was 
required [in the quest for political power] was undiluted racism combined with strong and disciplined 
central leadership."30 Not only did Tyndall fail to deliver electoral success, he tainted the image of the 
BNP, which made restoring political respectability a central concern for Griffin when he took over. 
Griffin directed his energy into modernizing the party and continually rejecting the extreme label the 
BNP gained under Tyndall. However, the public remains skeptical because of the image Tyndall 
promoted in the past. His leadership harmed the BNP, which is so "delegitimized by association with 
fascism and violence" that it "has no hope of becoming a serious national force."31 
In contrast, strong leadership has been consistent among radical right populist parties in the 
Netherlands. Before Geert Wilders, the current leader of the PVV, Pim Fortuyn was the country's 
central populist leader. He was charismatic and took a less extreme stance on many issues, causing 
"the stigma of 'extreme right' . . .  [to be] broken for good."" When Wilders took center stage, the 
public was responsive because Fortuyn previously established a respectable image. However, in 
comparison to Fortuyn, Wilders is "more radical in regards to immigration and integration" and "he 
criticizes the establishment more harshly."33 Because Fortuyn did not taint the party's image like 
Tyndall did with the BNP, Wilders does not meet resistance for his more extreme positions. Success 
is, in part, dependent upon the leader and past leaders who worked to shape the party. The PVV has 
this advantage, which contributes to its electoral success. 
Party organization also impacts electoral success, and is critical for a party that wishes to 
institutionalize and compete with mainstream parties. In the United Kingdom, "[b]oth the BNP and 
29 Norris 2005, 14 
30 Copsey 2007, 66 
31 Eatwell1998, 153 
32 Mudde 2007, 211 
33 Van Kessel 2011, 75 
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UKIP have experienced infighting and continual organizational problems which jeopardize their 
electoral chances."34 Over time, they have made improvements in basic party operations, such as 
Internet development and recruitment efforts. However, the biggest challenge that remains is for the 
radical right to become a united force. After various leadership disputes, both the BNP and UKIP 
have become more stable and internally united, but they still compete against each other for votes, 
which takes away from the success the radical right can achieve as a whole. 
The PVV, on the other hand, is united and well-organized, which has allowed it to more 
easily become an established party in the Dutch political system. Party operations are directed by 
Wilders, who "managed to build up a united party organization under his own firm leadership while 
sending out an appealing message to a large share of Dutch voters."35 The PVV may be running 
smoothly now, but since Wilders is its only formal member the party's future may be at risk. The 
LPF completely fell apart after Fortuyn's death because, like Wilders, he was the core of his party and 
made all the decisions. To maintain efficient party operations, Wilders may allocate some of his 
control or, in his absence, the PVV would likely face the same fate as the LPF. 
Conclusion 
As Norris explains, "the key to radical right success depends upon the complex interaction 
of public demand and party supply under conditions of imperfect competition in a regulated electoral 
marketplace."36 Success cannot be explained by supply or demand alone, but in the cases of Britain 
and the Netherlands where demand is quite similar, differences in supply-side factors can be 
examined to determine why populist parties are more likely to succeed in the Netherlands. In terms 
of demand, the PVV, BNP, and UK1P all focus on the same ideals in an attempt to respond to 
public grievances stemming from immigration, the EU, globalization, and a perceived loss of 
democracy. These grievances drive the emergence of populist parties, and '\vill continue to cultivate 
opportunity for the extreme right."37 However, to explain the success of these parties, both internal 
and external supply side factors need to be examined. 
In the Netherlands, supply factors created a favorable opportunity structure for Geert 
Wilders' Dutch Party for Freedom to emerge and experience electoral success. With an open 
electoral system, consensus-oriented politics, and depillarizarion of Dutch society, the Netherlands 
was ready and available for a party like the PVV." Internal factors also play a role: the PVV is a well­
organized party with strong leadership. Supply-side factors in Britain are quite the opposite, and have 
gready harmed populist parties' chances at success. In Britain, the FPTP system is the root of many 
34 John an d Margetts 2009, 501 
35 Van Kessel 201 1, 85 
36 Norris 2005, 4 
37 Goodwin 2012, 28 
38 Lucardie 2008, 165 
10 I RE S PUB LIe A 
electoral struggles the BNP and the UKIP face. It not only makes winning seats difficult, but also 
leads to an extremely structured party system, in which outside parties cannot compete. These parties 
may have answers to electorate concerns, but that does not mean the electorate is available and 
willing to vote for them. Lack of organization and leadership also hindered the success of the BNP 
and UKIP. Parties have control over these internal supply-side factors, but even if they can work 
them in their favor, factors outside of party control will still be present, preventing populist parties in 
Britain from experiencing electoral success on par with their Dutch counterparts. 
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